Looking in the Mirror (Part One)
Two weeks after the LSE received Lord Woolf’s report it was announced that
David Held is to leave
for Durham University. It
appears to confirm the original story of an institution and a few of its
employees gone astray. But is this
a true picture? A wider
investigation, going far beyond Lord’s Woolf’s terms of reference, could well
draw a different conclusion: the LSE is the rule and not the exception, and in
Britain today the source of a university’s funding is less important than its
amount; and this is normal business practice, supported by the government.
Asking businesses to contribute through a new tax is also likely to
mean that the higher education system will have to be more responsive to
their demands; and there is a risk that these may displace
the choices made by students.” (My emphasis)[xl]
So let us go back and do our own inquiry.[i] Its starting point is professor
Held’s apologia, published shortly after the spring uprising, and before
the NATO intervention in Libya. On
their own terms it is hard to disagree with these justifications. They are all
so reasonable! For wherever there
is a real possibility of softening the cruelty of a regime, of weakening it
from within, a serious person will try to do so; although it may lead to
difficult moral choices. However,
we must be careful; for self-interest and political myopia can blind us to the
real consequences of our actions; and it is easy to hide the truth from
ourselves.
In 1979 Ernest Gellner discussed this very dilemma; in his
case Czechoslovakia under a Communist state. For him there was a distinction between an authoritarian
regime that was amenable to reform and one that was not:
[When the regime was still highly repressive t]o have gone
would have meant, among other things, shaking the hand of this Director [a
party hack and placement of the dictator], an ignoramus who had benefited from
the incarceration, and worse, of his predecessors. Moral problem No.1 is simple: in these circumstances, would
you accept an invitation to go?
The question answers itself.
No decent man would go, and I wish no decent man had gone.
He goes on to write:
But now it is more than a
quarter of a century later. The
regime has softened. Above all,
all kinds of internal cross-currents and strains can be discerned, and some of
those internal currents earn one’s respect both by what they stand for and by
the courage of those who represent them… [and after writing of various complex
scenarios he concludes] The moment
when it counts has come at
last… Would I go? Of course I would go… In [this] situation… when decency and
oppression have joined in battle under reasonably well-defined banners, most
men would go and help. (Culture,
Identity, and Politics)
Gellner recognises these are two extremes, and that in most
cases the choices will be far more difficult; with the hardest choice right at
the beginning - when can we know that the regime has softened? The decision has to be a personal one,
based on the knowledge of the country and a judgement as to its political
situation. We can often get it
wrong.
Gellner was writing about Eastern Europe, a country occupied
by an enemy power. Liberalising
the regime was therefore in accordance with the geo-political wishes of Western
governments. Thus although the
politics were complicated internally, they were a relatively simple external
matter: there was no tension between our rulers’ interests and our
intellectuals’ liberal ideals.
This was not the case in Libya. As the history shows, and contemporary events all too
clearly illustrate, our governments do not want democracy in the Middle East.[iii] The populations have to win
it for themselves; not only from their own regimes, but from their supporters: America, Britain and the other European
powers. This complicates matters
considerably, for not only must the engaged intellectual navigate the complex
situation inside the host country, he must also do so within his own.
Libya today is no longer the
pariah state it was not so long ago, when gross violations of human rights took
place against the backdrop of UN, EU and US sanctions against the country,
which was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism by the USA until 2006.
There is no doubt that the climate of fear and repression that prevailed in
Libya for more than three decades is subsiding gradually, and that some Libyans
are now more willing to take risks –
albeit modest and within
limits – to speak out about issues that affect their everyday lives…
Nonetheless, Libya’s reintegration into the international
community has not been accompanied by significant reforms or long-lasting
improvements in the domestic human rights situation. The slow pace of domestic
reform contrasts sharply with Libya’s increased visibility on the international
scene and prompts fears that members of the EU and the USA, rather than using
the opportunity to encourage reforms, are turning a blind eye to the human
rights situation in order to further their national interests, which include
cooperation in counter-terrorism, the control of irregular migration, trade and
other economic benefits. (Amnesty
International’s 2010
report on Libya)
A Memorandum of Understanding was agreed between Britain and
Libya in 2007, which covered extradition; criminal, civil and commercial
law. Was the purpose of these
agreements to promote civil society in Libya, or was it to help the British
authorities: to make deportation easier, and to facilitate the transfer of
diplomatically embarrassing prisoners; one of whom was an obstacle to lucrative
defence and commercial contracts?[iv] According to Amnesty International when it agreed this
memorandum Libya gave assurances that it would not torture repatriated
terrorist suspects; and that the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (GDF)
would monitor this undertaking.
However, a British
court did not accept these assurances, made by both the British and Libyan governments, and rejected an
extradition request for two men suspected of terrorism.
Although human rights are often sacrificed to geo-political
interests our governments also need to convince us they are acting in good
faith. It is not surprising, therefore,
to find Britain promoting an organisation like the GDF, which gives legitimacy
to both the regime and to our resumption of diplomatic relations with it. It doesn’t follow that we should
completely reject this organisation, its very existence can protect people; and
it appears to have done so since its formation. However, there are serious questions about its sincerity and
purpose; and the wisdom of identifying too closely with it.[vi] These are tough questions, and it
would be wrong to focus on one individual, as John Keane does in his
open letter to David Held.[vii] His judgement may have been poor;
but it was largely determined by the culture in which he works.
Most British universities take money from repressive
regimes. Libya was singled out
because Gaddafi had long been a hate figure for the Western media; never fully
assimilated since Tony Blair turned him into a respectable statesman in
2004. Libya was a “rogue state”
for many years, and its repression and cruelty were a continuing part of its
identity, reinforced by its terrorist acts against British citizens, which have
not been forgotten. The outrage
against the LSE reflects this media bias; shown in its lack of concern about
funding from other authoritarian states,[viii] as robustly argued by Meghnad
Desai. His
responses are instructive: our universities are dependent upon private
funds and they will get them from anywhere, from dodgy corporations to mad
tyrants.
The
endowment of this chair should be seen as part, and a very important part, of
the kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s efforts to present the beliefs, thinking and
culture of Islam to the non-Moslem world. The professor of Islamic Studies,
when he is appointed, will not be here simply to pronounce on dogma but to
enlighten and explain the development of Islamic thinking in the past and to
encourage its development in the future. (A Degree of
Influence,)[x]
This is the Saudi ambassador establishing a Chair in Islamic
Studies at SOAS. Should a
university accept a million pound donation to help a state propagate its
ideology; which it uses to validate its existence, and prevent popular reform?
The ban was also backed by the president
of the Mutawa’een (religious police), the Council of Senior Ulema (religious
clerics) and the Shura Council (a consultative body appointed by the
king). (Saudi
Arabia urged to reverse ban on peaceful protest.)
It is clearly authoritarian:
The authorities used a range of
repressive measures in the name of countering terrorism, undermining embryonic
legal reforms. Vague and broadly written anti-terrorism laws were used to
suppress freedom of expression and other legitimate activities. The security
forces failed to respect even these laws, knowing they could act with impunity.
(from Amnesty International’s 2010 report
on Saudi Arabia)
Its repression includes religious persecution:
Shi’a Muslims and at least one Christian
were targeted for their beliefs. Eighteen Isma’ili Shi’a Muslims, 17 of whom
had been serving 10-year prison sentences since 2000, were released. Most were
prisoners of conscience.
Saudi Arabia is not promoting Islam, only one of its sects –
Wahhabism -, which it uses to undermine other Islamic traditions not only
within its own borders, but also in other countries.[xii] One by-product is the ideology of
al-Qaeda and the Jihadi movement generally, used to justify terrorism both
against Western imperialism and other Muslims who do not share these beliefs. As one reads this ambassador’s words
one wonders: in the Cold War did any British university accept an endowed chair
from the Soviet Union, the purpose of which was to spread the state’s
ideology? And whose ideological
off shoots killed German business leaders and an Italian Prime Minister.
There are two questions here:
- Does
this funding have a political purpose?
- Does
it affect academic freedom?
The answer to the first question is yes.[xiii] It is used to legitimatise these
regimes. And although there
appears some direct manipulation of thought and opinion, legitimacy is achieved
by subtler means; more akin to the Fabian idea of permeation. This is the way states and political
leaders become absorbed into the Western establishment, where perceptions are
changed through the natural processes of human sympathy; such as regular and
positive contact between their respective elites.[xiv] Lobbyists have been doing it for
years.[xv] It is not difficult! There are few obstacles to a warm
welcome, for those who want to be our friends. For there must be no illusions about our own society, and
its real but limited liberalism: too forgiving of the abuses of our mates;
hysterical in the denunciations of our enemies.[xvi]
There is no necessary connection between academic freedom
and funding.[xvii] Part of the resistance to the Vietnam
War took place in a university department wholly funded
by the Pentagon.[xviii] It is up to the universities and the
individual to exercise their consciences; and to ensure they remain
independent. The conformist
pressures of these institutions make this difficult;[xix] thus the majority of academics are not radical critics; most tend to support
their governments. Yet, if we are
concerned about academic freedom it is the influence of the British state that
should concern us; massively increasing its control of the universities since
the reforms of the 1980s.[xx]
Take Liverpool John Moores University. In a press statement we
read its Libyan work had the “full support and encouragement of the UK
Government and associated agencies.”[xxi] Its projects included health,
education and business. Two things
are occurring here: the narrowly technocratic and the political; the government
using the university to embed Libya within its sphere of influence. This could lead to better living
conditions (for some), and a stronger
authoritarian regime. This creates
a tension, which each person must recognise and navigate; although this
requires some scepticism and a political understanding. Are the university’s administrators
even aware such tensions exist?
The universities are part of a culture where business and
national security interests are conflated, and where increasingly it is the
market that determines priorities.[xxii] Given such a society, and the
imperialism on which it rests,[xxiii] it is inevitable that hard moral issues will arise; and people will make
mistakes. Held put into a political situation without the requisite skills and
experience.
However, it doesn’t follow that we are just victims of an
impersonal historical force.[xxiv] Did you spot my previous mistake? It is not the market but its
institutions, particularly the multi-national corporations, who determine our
government’s policies. But if you
didn’t, mightn’t that be part of the acculturation we accept so naturally;
reconciling ourselves to the inevitability of our servitude.
As Chalmers Johnson has written, globalization has many
names, but its most revealing is the Washington Consensus. Thomas
Frank and Susan
George provide insights into this American nexus of ideology and power: the
large corporations and wealthy billionaires whose money supports foundations,
publishers, journalists, academics and large media outlets.[xxv] It is a movement that arises
naturally out of the corporate structure of America; and which resembles the
old Communist Party; though with a significant difference – no one notices.[xxvi] This is only one strand, but a major
one, in the creation of the contemporary world economy. In the 1990’s one target of the
Washington Consensus, as Johnson shows, was to remove any competing model of
capitalism: thus the ideological attack on the East Asian economies; and the
concerted efforts, resulting in the 1997 financial crisis, to undermine and
change them.
The last forty years has seen an intense class war: the very
rich against the rest. A problem
for the Left has been that the political organisations created to stop the
previous one have been co-opted – the Labour Party an enthusiastic member of
the Washington establishment. This
has obscured this conflict, as many liberal intellectuals seek to justify it,
through the rhetoric of “liberalization” and the “free market”.
Gadafy steps into the vacuum left by the absence of
effective mechanisms of government, and the result is a de facto dictatorship.
Libya will not progress if the current system stays intact. Libya needs a new
constitution, and representative government must play a significant part in it.
On economic change, Gadafy was less equivocal. He was not negative about
globalisation, as so many politicians in developing countries are, and
recognised that Libya must change to prosper. He accepts the need to reform
banking, diversify the economy, train entrepreneurs and dismantle inefficient
state-owned enterprises. Impressive progress has been made towards these
objectives in the past three years.
As one-party states go, Libya
is not especially repressive. Gadafy seems genuinely popular. Our discussion of
human rights centred mostly upon freedom of the press. Would he allow greater
diversity of expression in the country? There isn't any such thing at the
moment. Well, he appeared to confirm that he would. Almost every house in Libya
already seems to have a satellite dish. And the internet is poised to sweep the
country...
Will real progress be
possible only when Gadafy leaves the scene? I tend to think the opposite. If he
is sincere in wanting change, as I think he is, he could play a role in muting
conflict that might otherwise arise as modernisation takes hold. My ideal
future for Libya in two or three decades' time would be a Norway of North
Africa: prosperous, egalitarian and forward-looking. Not easy to achieve, but
not impossible.
“No decent man would go,
and I wish no decent man had gone.”
Maybe Gellner was too harsh; and all tyrants should be talked to, if
only to find out what they think.
This though goes way beyond mere “engagement”; it is boosterism for a
newfound friend. Amnesty
International writing just three years after this visit described Libya’s human
rights record as “dire”. In 2008, a year
after Giddens wrote these words, it said:
The UN Human Rights Committee commented that “almost
all subjects of concern remain unchanged” since it last examined Libya’s record
on civil and political rights in 1998.
It is the insouciance of
his remarks that both shocks, and is somewhat repugnant. This was the same year Blair made his
visit to the country, and one year after the US took Libya off its terrorist
list (at the time the ANC and Nelson Mandela were still on this list). Did he do any research, or did he just
pick up the vibe in the foreign office and the British Council; a general sense
that Gaddafi is a good guy now because one of us? He wasn’t listening to the US ambassador:
“Despite the GOL's strategic decision in 2003 to take
steps to facilitate its acceptance back into the community of nations, the
regime remains essentially thuggish in its approach, particularly on issues it
perceives to involve domestic political equities.” (2009
cable – Wikileaks)[xxvii]
What is apparent is the
professor’s lack of interest in politics.
Only the technical details count: get the formal arrangements in place,
such as the constitution; change the economic structure, obviously increase
privatisation; while the talk about freedom of expression is quickly conflated
into one about technology – the internet and satellite dish are the solution,
although the details are left unspecified.[xxviii] And everything is looked over by
our friendly tyrant, who we trust to reform the nation. This is the worldview of the
technocrat, and a member of the establishment, who believes that fine phrases
and gentle persuasion, the sharing of ideas (or more accurately intellectual
formulas and clichés), and the implementation of the right policy, are enough
to change the world. There is
little understanding of politics, with its desires for power, and the
aggression and ruthlessness of those who have acquired illegitimate authority,
and risk losing it.[xxix]
Gaddafi is no longer a
tyrant but a “de facto” dictator; a sort of switch or cog who exists only
because the “mechanisms of government” are not in place. He can’t help it. He has become an historical force;
there is no agency whatsoever – at best he will play a “muting” role if
modernization leads to any conflicts.[xxx] He has to be a dictator until the
experts arrive to provide the means that will deliver freedom and
prosperity. Everything is reduced
to either the technical details or to the law of historical inevitability – no,
not Marxism, but globalization; the new opium of the intellectuals.
“’Stalin is not a
dictator… [he] is the Pope.’ The religion is still Lenin’s and the
faith lies in collective immorality.
Stalin becomes an instrument of the Life Force needed to implement
Leninism and to break the pattern of collapsing civilizations… [in the Soviet
Union] he saw the realists in charge of the philistines… ‘he was overwhelmed by the
purposefulness and earnest conviction he met’… When progressive ideas appeared in the Soviet Russia [he
said] ‘ the entire state apparatus, all its organs, the press and public
opinion set about realizing these ideas’…” (Michael Holroyd, The
Lure of Fantasy)
George Bernard Shaw was
also a technocrat, who by the 1930s disliked democracy because it got in the
way of progressive reform. Things
have changed since then: today it is believed that progressive reforms by
themselves will create the good society.
I have to say, I think Shaw was more honest and realistic.
The reason Shaw disliked
democracy was because the rich and powerful used it to frustrate reform. However, he put too much faith in the
bureaucrats. Giddens, by contrast,
thinks those same vested interests are the carriers of progressive
politics. Now it is their
opponents, more accurately their victims, who are the problem: they are so negative about globalization; which he equates with
enlightenment. He doesn’t want to
understand their concerns; instead he dismisses them completely – they are
heretics from the true faith, and thus by definition cannot be reasonable men.[xxxi] It is an easy tactic to avoid
their substantive criticisms; such as of Joseph
Stiglitz’s about Russian shock therapy, which pauperised the majority to
allow “a few oligarchs to become billionaires.”[xxxii] I imagine Gaddafi had a better
understanding of contemporary history.
Giddens is very close to Shaw – the continuities are striking. However, although the approach is
similar the values have changed; for the liberal technocrats are now inside the
establishment, whose nature has been transformed.
The problem of concentrating on individuals should be
manifest: it is the culture that will determine how people will in general act
– only a minority ever escape its conditioning. This establishment culture may well have become a political
problem, of a particularly peculiar kind.[xxxiii]
In the late 1950s it was argued that the old critical
intelligentsia, often Marxists outside the academy, had been replaced by
technical experts; who provided value free solutions to the problems of modern
society. In this view, called The
End of Ideology thesis, the businessman could hold hands with the intellectual;
and everybody would benefit. Daniel
Bell was providing an ideological justification for a trend taking place
across the Western World.[xxxiv] In Britain there was the large
influence of Anthony Crosland on the Labour Party: his idea that high growth
would enable limited redistribution; managed by the executive and its agencies. Ernest Gellner called this the danegeld
state. Legitimacy would be won, and popular disquiet bought off, by
ever increasing economic prosperity.[xxxv]
In the 1960s this rather complacent view was attacked. A new Left evolved, influenced
particularly by Gramsci, but which was separated from the institutions of the
traditional working class. In the
1970s and 80s this new Left tried to change the Labour movement; but it failed
and was expunged.[xxxvi] Since then the political parties
have turned to business. Politicians
are corporate managers, and parliamentary politics is a lucrative career,
rather than a vision of social change.
Meanwhile the critics, the so-called “value intellectuals”, are once
again alienated; just like the bohemians and radicals of the 19th century. Politics has been
reduced, all rhetoric aside, to facilitating corporate business; which means
leaving the culture and its institutional structure largely intact. We are back to the expert. Thus
Giddens’ analysis, which assumes values arise naturally from out of the
technical details: get the forms right and freedom and democracy will follow,
almost automatically.[xxxvii]
There were other changes too. Daniel Bell was writing close to the heyday of social
democracy. By the 1960s the
ideology of the corporate state was a mixture of social justice and business;
the latter always in the ascendancy.
Since the 1970s business has become all pervasive: it is the ideology of the state sector. To take just one
example: local authorities are themselves dominated by the corporate culture,
with its auditing, its ideology and its PR departments; which have grown
extraordinarily over the last 20 years.[xxxviii] This has resulted in a subtle
shift. By the 1960s the Fabian
idea of permeation seemed to have worked, with the Keynesian ideology,
predicated on competent administration of the macro economy by state officials,
ensuring a managed capitalism where profit and justice could reach a fruitful
compromise. Capitalism could be reformed, and be made more successful.[xxxix] In the 1970s the balance shifted – towards the
financial institutions. This
changed the governing culture and the technical experts who worked for it; now
providing their analytical and hieratic skills to the multi-nationals[xl] and the transformed corporate state; run now on business principles. A by-product of this shift has been the
huge growth in corporate foundations and their think tanks; producing a vast
infrastructure of “experts” who help create a thick texture of orthodox
opinion; and which includes our universities. For its results compare Giddens with Shaw, and notice that
slight change in emphasis, which turns the corporations into a progressive
force. The consequence is that we
have a business culture but no organised opposition. The results are not surprising. The Browne
Review, hardly a radical document of
the Left, and although talking about higher education, sums it up quite nicely:
[ii] Or only a little tension: thus the curious incident
involving Frank Zappa, where the US administration put pressure on the first
post-Communist government in Czechoslovakia not to work with him. See Ben Watson’s Frank
Zappa; the Negative Dialectics of Poodle Play.
[iii] A good overview of the recent history is Robert Fisk’s
The
Great War for Civilisation. See for example his coverage of the
aftermath of the First Gulf War and Bush Senior’s decision not to aid the Shi
rebels in their uprising against Saddam Hussein.
The
‘Arab Spring’ has been an unwelcome surprise for Washington and its
allies. It has reluctantly
followed events; sometimes supporting the peoples’ demands when a dictator
loses power; and it has become impossible to maintain him (Libya the one
exception). However, as Chomsky
has noted, these regimes are still in place; just a few personnel have
changed. One would expect over the
coming months for the West to support these regimes against their peoples’
demands; with greater attention, perhaps, to the forms of a democracy, rather
than its content.
[iv] At the same time as these were being signed Blair was
agreeing a defence contract worth £325 million and a BP contract of £500
million. There are strong
suspicions, and from within the establishment, that these contracts were tied
to the release of al-Megrahi. See
the US ambassador’s remarks in the Wikileaks
cables:
“Saif
al-Islam implied that former UK PM Tony Blair had raised
Megrahi with the Libyan leader in connection with lucrative business deals
during Blair's 2007 visit to Libya. [Note: Rumors that Blair made linkages
between Megrahi's release and trade deals have been longstanding among Embassy
contacts.]” (parentheses in
original)
While
in another Wikileaks
cable the US ambassador quotes the threats made to British business if
al-Megrahi were to die in prison, and the results for US interests if the
administration was seen to be connected to this decision:
“…that
U.S. interests could face similar consequences, including regime-orchestrated
demonstrations against the Embassy, retaliation against U.S. business interests
and possible obstruction of the travel of official and private Americans...”
Perhaps
more telling is the following, from the same cable:
“U.K.
Embassy interlocutors here tell us they are planning for a scenario in which
the U.K.-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) is ratified in early March and
the GOL makes application shortly thereafter for al-Megrahi's transfer to
Libya.”
The
expectation was that the 2007 agreements would lead to al-Megrahi’s release.
Surely one doesn’t have to be too cynical to think that they were drafted for
that very purpose; with perhaps a touch of ambiguity to allow for a get out
clause, if things were to go wrong later.
Jack Straw seems to
have confirmed this:
“Official
documents published this week show that Mr Straw initially intended to exclude
Mr Megrahi from a PTA that was being negotiated as part of normalising British
relations with Libya. The justice secretary subsequently changed his stance,
asserting that it was in the UK's interests to agree to Libyan requests not to
exclude the convicted bomber. The U-turn followed lobbying by BP, the energy
group, which consequently sealed an oil deal with Libya.” (Financial
Times)
The
justification for all this activity is that it will make the country
internationally respectable. In
this worldview it is money that is the great civilising force… As we shall see the former chief
executive of BP has a more blunt and realistic view of what is going on.
[v] For earlier concerns about Britain’s and Libya’s
intentions read the article by Mohammed Al Shafey
in asharq alawsat. For
recent comment see Gareth
Pierce in the Guardian.
“…the
repatriation of Megrahi was recently unveiled by the QDF as one of its three
priority objectives.”
It’s
work done we wonder if this was one of the reasons it decided to no longer
promote political reform and human rights in Libya in December 2010 (Ronald
Bruce St John).
Professor
Held was a trustee of this organisation, until
advised to step down.
[viii] It has become an issue now, but it is has not, except
in a few places, led to any great outcry. What other university is to
have an investigation like that of Lord
Woolf’s?
[ix] This assessment is confirmed by the Browne
Review: “We recognise that public
investment in higher education is reducing.”
Reacting
to the plagiarism charges Lord Desai concentrates on funding by foreign
students, thus sidestepping the issues of corporate and foreign state financing
(so does Browne in his review – I couldn’t see any figures in the report). If both are to be believed it is only
the government and the students who fund our universities (in Browne’s case he
makes the fallacious inference that if the latter pay more fees they will have
more influence; an argument the report itself contradicts: funds are to be
targeted to key academic categories, defined by government and the business
world). Emmanuel
Akpan-Inwang notes that only 15% of the LSE funding comes from government;
while 70% of the students come from outside the country. This latter figure reflects the LSE’s
particular history, but may also suggest one result of market pressure: to
increase the number of high paying foreign students to make up for the funding
gaps. Simon Jenkins is sadly
confused in
his article. After a brief
summary of the history, and the Thatcher decision to "bring higher
education institutions closer to the world of business”, with the inevitable
tightening of government control this entails, he concludes:
“But
higher education institutions need governance with the guts to break the
umbilical cord with government and the past, and with the guts to tell good
private money from bad. Leftwing academics may regard tycoons, like Tory
ministers, as capitalist oppressors of the working class. But they are
preferable to Libyan dictators.”
It
is precisely because the LSE and the other universities have become businesses
that they have gone after repressive regimes (governments can actually preserve
intellectual freedom, if they rule within a culture that values public service,
as our universities before the 1980s showed, however imperfectly. Jenkins’ understanding of the market is
also strangely deficient: contrary to his belief it requires a strong state,
for it has to impose its rules and ideology onto the rest of the society; that
is why Baker and Thatcher did what he described.). The companies and tycoons (remember Tiny Rowland?) that
Jenkins would tap for cash are also the same ones who work in Libya, Saudi
Arabia and China; and who also encourage religious extremism (eg the Religious
Right in America) and deregulation; with their attendant social costs
(unemployment and pollution to name just two). George
Soros actually recommended Saif Gaddafi to the LSE. It isn’t so easy to separate the good
money from the bad – what standards should we use? Rather, we need to change the culture, as Stefan
Collini suggests; a utopian idea, perhaps, in a world where the corporate
ethos rules. His example of the
drive for external funding of the administrators shows how far that ethos is
now embedded within our universities.
However, it is much wider
than this – if you are interested take a look at the charity sector.
In
a different article, quoted in the
New York Times, Lord Desai is more explicit: “Academic research needs money
- Rockefeller was a Robber baron once, we take his money.”
His
reasoning in the original Guardian piece
is odd, but instructive. He is
right that the LSE should not be criticised retrospectively; but locates the
problem in Gaddafi’s actions now, which have upset the Western governments and
its intellectual class. The real
issue, of course, is the relationship with Gaddafi and the government over the
previous seven years, and the then decision to accept substantial funding from
the regime, and which may have been politically motivated. But for a businessman or technocrat
morality isn’t important – profit and results are all that counts. Therefore, on his own terms, he is
quite right.
It
is unfair to single out the LSE and to concentrate on Libya. To do so reflects the bias of the
culture; where the bad guys are really the nice guys, when they are our
friends. Of course, when we don’t
like them anymore they change miraculously: all of a sudden they become noxious
and untouchable. David Held, as we
will see, exhibits this tendency, almost to the extreme; because he is
personally involved. Lord Desai,
more distant, and more cynical perhaps, but also more honest, notes our
hypocrisy.
[x]
The
Centre for Social Cohesion. This report shows a curious and telling
bias: it concentrates on Arabic, East Asian and Eastern European/Russian
funding of UK universities; but doesn’t mention the USA at all; the worst
offender, when it comes to human rights abuses worldwide. Neither is there a discussion of the
malign influence of corporations and right wing foundations, particularly in
the United States, but in Britain too, who support environmental and human
degradation in return for high profits and market share; and who spend millions
seeking to influence public opinion, through a
variety of channels, including the universities. Why are these not targeted, as they are both more
influential and more dangerous? In
the report there is mention of only two examples: BBV and British Petroleum.
“…the
British Petroleum Institute Fund in Cambridge is ‘under the control of a Board
of Managers’ who consist of a variety of academics but also ‘three persons
appointed by the General Board, two of whom shall be appointed on the
nomination of British Petroleum plc.’
Though
the criticism is very light: there can be conflicts of interest. No examples are given, though a few
recent ones come to mind, particularly regarding Libya and the LSE.
Let’s
look a little further. The author,
Robin Simcox, is a Section Director at the Henry Jackson Society; another seemingly innocuous think thank, working for
the public good. Let’s have a look
at some of its principles:
“Supports the maintenance of a strong military,
by the United States, the countries of the European Union and other democratic
powers, armed with expeditionary capabilities with global reach…” to protect
against strategic threats, terrorism and genocide.
“Believes that only modern liberal democratic
states are truly legitimate, and that the political or human rights
pronouncements or any international or regional organisation which admits
undemocratic states lack the legitimacy to which they would be entitled if all
their members were democracies.”
This
rules out the UN, of course, and buttresses the first point: unilateral action
by the United States and its allies; on the grounds that they determine. One result: the invasion of Iraq.
Who
supports this organisation? Let’s look again:
·
Michael Chertoff, former
director of Homeland Security in the United States
·
Richard Perle, former
Secretary of Defence in the United States
·
General Jack Sheehan,
former NATO Supreme Allied Commander
·
James Woolsey, former
director of the CIA…
Their website has links to all the usual
suspects: The Heritage Foundation,
American Enterprise Institute, The Cato Institute…
Given the power and influence of these characters and
their organisations, and the actions of the country they have served –
invasion, terrorism and torture, to name just a few – shouldn’t the author be a
little more self-reflective, and critical of his own work, and the institutions
that may influence it? Shouldn’t
he be writing a detailed report about them? Will it be his next one,
I wonder. If it is, will the Centre
for Social Cohesion publish it…
Shouldn’t we be suspicious of an author who only
concentrates on the actions of the perceived enemies; rather than the often
more pernicious ones of our national friends? To give just one example: why concentrate on the religious
influence of Saudi Arabia in UK universities, whose effects are debateable, but
ignore British and American arms sales to this same country, whose results are
not – we saw them in Bahrain throughout this year. Surely, of the two, this is the more serious concern; if you
are really worried about the repressive nature of such a regime. And given the patrons of the
foundation, a task which is in many ways much easier to rectify.
The
Independent quotes the report’s
press release; while the New
Statesman uses it to attack our
universities, for their “morally dubious sources” of funding. However, in
Duncan Robinson’s piece there is no reference to the nature of this think tank,
the author, the foundation for which he works, or its patrons; all of whom may
have an agenda; and may also be responsible for supporting more heinous crimes
than our preferred enemies.
Gaddafi and King Fahd are bad enough, but they haven’t been responsible
for anything like the devastation Britain and the United States has achieved
during the last decade alone.
The
Duncan Robinson article shows the limits of debate on this topic within the
left-liberal culture. The most
tolerant tacitly supporting the pro-British regimes whilst looking to work
within its ruling culture; while the intolerant attack Islam altogether. The one quietly supports British
imperialism; the other shouts it from the rooftops, and is much more
totalitarian – our clients must worship not only our dollars and planes, but
our thoughts and thinkers too.
(There are exceptions but they tend to be marginalized: compare the
treatment of Terry
Eagleton to Martin Amis; an example of market mechanisms, but where the
pressures towards liberal conformity reinforce the commercial appeal of the
celebrity author over the critic). This prejudice is reflected in Robinson’s article: it only
refers to Islamic countries, and ignores the report’s extensive coverage of
East Asia and Russia (the only Asian state mentioned is Malaysia, which just
happens to be majority Islam).
For
more on the Centre for Social Cohesion see Spinwatch; which notes its heavy bias against Islam; which can
be easily confirmed by visiting its website.
[xi] Compare these
comments with the Guardian’s editorial on February 25 2011. Note
the lack of harsh criticism: the regime could almost be benign with its “deep
pockets”, its conservative religious establishment, and its “formidable”
security apparatus. We are given
only a little sense of its repressive nature; while there is no moral
condemnation at all. Yes, it is
conservative, and yes, it must change, but fundamentally the regime is sound,
is the view here. Thus that last
sentence:
“…ordinary
Saudis want a share of power, not just to be the beneficiaries of it.” (my
emphasis)
Despite
the emollient language we can see what is at stake, and how this could be
connected to religious repression:
“If
the al-Khalifa ruling family in Bahrain were to go down, that would be a
terrible moment for Saudi Arabia.
If it were to be saved from such a fate by Saudi intervention, that might be
almost worse.
“Yet
the most likely outcome, a settlement which gives Bahrain's Shia community real
power, cannot but embolden Saudi Arabia's own Shia, clustered heavily in the oil
rich eastern region.”
[xii] William
Dalrymple has written of how Saudi Arabian backed Wahhabism is undermining
the religious traditions of Pakistan, particularly its Sufism.
[xiv] The Guardian’s editorial, mentioned above, is a good
example of the results of this exchange.
[xv] Thomas Frank’s The
Wrecking Crew shows how the
lobbyists have transformed Washington into a corporate capital; and where the
politicians, the corporations, and their advocates, are all part of the same
establishment; sharing its mores and ideology.
[xvi] The work of Noam Chomsky provides thousands of pages
of evidence on this alone.
[xvii] Though the Browne Review on funding in higher education believes there
is. See footnote xli below and the
quote to which it refers, which is very explicit on this connection.
[xviii] I refer of course to MIT, and Noam Chomsky.
[xxi] Colin
Talbot writes it was the same with the LSE: it was a "British
diplomatic strategy… of trying to open up connections with the Libyans.”
[xxii] The Browne Review of funding in higher education is instructive in this regard. Although there are the usual
genuflections to culture and the free-standing intellect its primary focus is
the competitiveness of Britain’s economy (which is not equal to its size). This is reflected in the diagnosis:
“Analysis from the
UKCES suggests that the higher education system does not produce the most
effective mix of skills to meet business needs. 20% of businesses report having a skills gap of some
kind in their existing workforce, up from 16% since 2007. The CBI found that
48% of employers were dissatisfied with the business awareness of the graduates
they hired.”
The conclusion
follows as a matter of course:
“This evidence
suggests there needs to be a closer fit between what is taught in higher
education and the skills needed in the economy.”
This will be
achieved by targeting resources to:
“…science and technology subjects, clinical medicine, nursing and other
healthcare degrees, as well as strategically important language courses.”
The
review is gift wrapped in the language of student choice. However, inside the pretty boxes all we
will find are the glossy brochures of our corporate companies.
[xxiii] Chalmers Johnson’s Blowback and The
Sorrows of Empire are two good
overviews of the military, financial and ideological imperialism of the United
States; of which Britain, of course, is a junior partner.
[xxv] How many people are worried about this money, and its
deleterious effects? Clearly not the
Centre for Social Cohesion, that
benefits from them; but what about the liberal academics in our own
universities? As Thomas Frank
shows, part of this Right-Republican strategy is to “defund the left” (that is
the Democrats who, as Chomsky notes, are now the moderate Republicans of about
40 years ago). Susan George writes
of how these institutions oppose liberal values, spending millions every year
to destroy them. How many of our
academics and commentators resist this influence? How many are even aware of it?
[xxvi] Though their own ideologues are very explicit about
it: often modelling themselves on Lenin, or the radical groups of the
1960s. The other difference is
there is no central committee, rather it is a “network of networks”, and
resembles, in many respects, the jihadists they hate so much.
[xxvii] This cable is interesting for a number of
reasons. Its main concern is the
technical question of how the US can reconcile the competing demands of its
domestic constituency with its support for Britain and the Libyan regime. There doesn’t seem to be a way
out! The whys and wherefores
of the case are not considered; and one assumes are regarded as unimportant; which
is, note, the exact opposite of most of the newspaper commentary; which tends
to frame issues in moral terms, albeit usually in a very narrow, biased and
intolerant way. This suggests the executive are far more rational and clear
headed than the commentariat; albeit their thinking is determined by the
instrumental needs of the state.
They will tend to know more about our enemies than our newspapers do,
and will have a wider focus – other concerns weigh more than the narrow range
of issues discussed by a commentator or editor. In this case there are three constituencies for policy
makers to consider; while the moral angle, foregrounded by the press, matters
not all – they are not even thinking about it.
The
discussion is framed around protecting US facilities in Libya, should there be
a public uproar if al-Megrahi dies in prison, and if the regime is unable to
control it. However, given the
recent uprisings, it has a larger resonance: the danger to Gaddafi and his
supporters of popular outrage. For
the ambassador recognises the differences between staged demonstrations and
genuine ones; and highlights the tension between popular sentiments on
sensitive issues and the actions of the regime.
A
question immediately arises. The
release of al-Megrahi is usually seen as a pay-off for oil and defence
contracts, and better diplomatic links.
But was the effect to bolster the regime, by reducing popular pressure
and tribal tension within the country?
One
wonders just how much of British policy has been concerned with reducing this
tension by strengthening the state; by providing weaponry and by some mild
social engineering; in effect creating safety values to release some of this
popular pressure. This is
recognised by
Fred Halliday in an indirect way in his criticism of the LSE’s engagement
with Libya; although he frames it differently: the purpose of liberal elements
inside the country is to reduce pressures from outside it. While this is undoubtedly true, I think
the emphasis is wrong: Western states can live quite easily with harsh, but
stable, regimes; providing the repression is not too obvious and severe so that
it affects the political culture back home. In Libya this “external pressure” is greater because of its
past actions against the West and the erratic character of its leader; given
maximum airplay over the years.
[xxviii] Previously the Left believed in educating people as
part of a movement of social change – learn the truth about your oppression so
you can act upon it. This seems to
have subtlety changed: technology by itself will make you free.
[xxix] For an excellent analysis of how the development
formulas of the World Bank and IMF are changed and corrupted when introduced
into “failed states” see Alex de Waal’s article in the LRB. My Remove
the Tribes has more comment.
Bertrand
Russell, in his classic Power:
a new social analysis, writes
that power is the explanatory factor to explain the workings of a society. It should not come as a surprise,
therefore, when our illustrious social scientists ignore it.
[xxx] An embarrassing phrase now of course. More importantly: what are these
conflicts, so quickly passed over?
The history of the last two centuries would suggest that most of them
are between the ruling elite and the populace; especially those parts of it
that are either impoverished by the new social changes or do not receive the
civil and political rights commensurate with their newly acquired wealth. The history also suggests that the
imperial powers tend to support the rulers; and their repression of
dissent. That is, modernization
doesn’t necessary lead to either prosperity or democracy for most of the
population; and given the fragility of the whole process one would be a little
wary of keeping a “thuggish” tyrant on the throne; especially one who is prone
to follow the shifts of international fashion (Gilbert
Achcar has a good summary of these in his interview with Doug Henwood).
[xxxi] So we have this caricature at the beginning of his
piece:
“Along
with Fidel Castro, Muammar Gadafy is the last of the revolutionaries. Most of
those who, 30 or 40 years ago, believed that capitalism could be overthrown,
and a different world ushered in, have long since disappeared. The radical left
now defines itself only by what it is against: America is the enemy, and anyone
who stands up against the west must be a force for the good, no matter how
corrupt or illiberal they might be.
“Gadafy
used to be as anti-western as they come.”
We
can draw one only conclusion: those who oppose Giddens and his friends in
Washington and Westminster are extremist lunatics. Reading this I was curious as to who he could have in mind. A quick search found some answers:
“We
urge the working class of the world to oppose the imperialist intervention into
Libya that is being made, and the greater, possibly military intervention to
come into the affairs of the Libyan people.
“We
urge the Libyan masses and youth to take their stand alongside Colonel Gaddafi
to defend the gains of the Libyan revolution, and to develop it.” (Workers
Revolutionary Party)
Eamonn
McCann’s comments in The Socialist Worker bear comparison with those of Giddens:
“I
once challenged Muammar Gaddafi when he suggested that Libya could support
revolutionary movements around the world while maintaining agreeable trade
relations with world power…
“
I found the exchange intriguing, congenial and charming…
“
For long stretches, Gaddafi was an attractive figure for many on the left…
“He
rejected the Stalinist model as well as Western capitalism. He instituted free housing and
education, banned the imams from politics and promoted the role of women…”
Notice
how, like Giddens, he begins his positive description of Gaddafi by stressing a
disagreement – not democracy in his case, but independence. And how, also like Giddens, he is
impressed by his interlocutor.
Then there is the theoretical overview, and Gaddafi’s positioning in the
international scene; together with a brief discussion of the social benefits he
has introduced. He fails to
mention that at a time when our friendly dictator was supposedly “an attractive
figure for the left” he was, in the words of Amnesty
International, repressing them in his own country:
“The
introduction of this new political system was accompanied by a crackdown on all
political opponents including Marxists, Trotskyists and members of banned
parties such as the Islamic Liberation Party, the Muslim Brotherhood and the
pro-Iraqi wing of the Ba’th Party.”
And
here is a description from 1972:
“…preaching
a return to primitive Islam… Libyans were denied their alcohol. Mini skirts were made maxi by
order. Street signs are in Arabic
only… In November 1972, it was
announced that the… punishment for theft and robbery, cutting off a hand and a
foot respectively, were to be revived.”
(Emrys Peters quoted in Ernest Gellner’s Muslim
Society)
McCann
and Giddens are mirror images of one another. In both cases there is a natural sympathy for the ruler,
together with a projection of their own belief systems onto him; in the one a
sort of revolutionary Marxism, in the other globalization. This blinds them to the realities on
the ground – their intellectual formulas and their relationship with the benign
ruler are more important than the lives of the people they are supposedly
trying to help. Ideology trumps
facts; and distorts them horribly; when they are not ignored completely
(contrast with Alex de Waal’s article in footnote xxix, which is sensitive to
the realities; and which shows how the mindset described here is also part of
the culture of the international NGOs; a particularly worrying feature.).
[xxxii] Introduction to Karl Polanyi’s The
Great Transformation. Polanyi’s book, as Stiglitz makes clear
in his introduction, has a different vision of societal change; one that
considers the social nature of a society.
[xxxiii] Susan George’s book, Hijacking America, shows how forty years of the corporate and
evangelical propaganda has significantly affected US culture. In practice it means, as Chomsky has
said, that Nixon was America’s last Liberal president. How far will it go? Will the boardrooms of Westinghouse and
General Motors speak in tongues as well as in Milton Friedman? Will the country return to a time
before its modest, but nevertheless important, welfare reforms? Is it regressing to the 19th century?
Edward
Gibbon famously, but incorrectly, blamed the fall of the Roman Empire on
Christianity (an early example of a modern intellectual giving too much weight
to ideas). We may with more
justice argue that the American empire could be wrecked by two religions: free
marked economics and Christian fundamentalism; which together hide a true
understanding of its institutions, and their destructiveness, from both the
general public and its intellectual class; and thus prevent constructive reform.
In
Britain it is only the cult of the market that has engrossed our political
class. Tony Blair, as ever, was
the exception – did he feel it made him more American?
[xxxv] Spectacles
and Predicaments has an extended
discussion of this idea, which appears throughout his work.
Interestingly
Gellner demolished another cult of the technician: the Oxford Linguistic
School. They also believed they
had a found a value free technique; in this case solving the problems of
philosophy through careful attention to ordinary language use. (See his Words
and Things for a devastating
analysis.)
[xxxvi] For two contrasting opinions on this conflict see Defeat
From the Jaws of Victory by Mike
Marqusee and Richard Heffernan, and Kenneth O. Morgan’s Labour
People, particularly the chapters
on Benn and Kinnock.
[xxxvii] And is curiously reminiscent of the Oxford Linguistic
School who conflated their technique with a value judgement (although they
couldn’t see it). Here it is a
given that the forms and processes are good in themselves, and because of their
fundamental rightness will produce the desired results. Shaw believed bureaucrats would sign
the progressive legislation.
Giddens believes the pen can be automated, to do the signing itself.
[xli] The argument is
itself narrowly self-interested: someone from the corporate sector advising the
government not to ask it to make greater contributions to higher
education. It also contradicts the
main thrust of the report, which is to make the universities more responsive to
the needs of the British economy; which in turn will affect what students can
study – resources are to be concentrated in certain areas it decides are
important. However, its analysis
has surely a lot of force, especially when we consider who is
writing this report, and the interests it reflects.
Nevertheless, though
I bow to Lord Browne’s greater authority, I wonder if he is being too much of
the vulgar Marxist: money is only part of the influence; which is essentially
about creating a business culture, where vice-chancellors feel as comfortable
with CEOs as they do with senior civil servants. Once that is achieved, everything else follows quite
naturally; as certain assumptions will be shared; and become unquestionable
(and are perhaps not even recognized).
Surely the fact that he was selected to head the review, and by a Labour
government, is an example of just such a process.
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